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I Introduction
Unemployment and underemployment in associa-
tion with low and irregular incomes are major
causes of urban poverty in India. Studies on the
Indian labour market show that the urban formal
sector has been unable to absorb the expanding
labour force resulting in the proliferation of the
informal sector where most of the urban poor seek
to ensure their livelihood (ILO 1996). A further
sign of continuously deteriorating labour market
conditions is the increase in casual employment
(Amis 1995: 487; cf. Kundu 1993). This trend has
not been reversed yet by the new economic policy
the Government of India adopted in July 1991 for
achieving higher economic growth rates. On the
contrary, it is mainly the urban poor who have to
burden the negative social impact of the ongoing
adjustment process (Moser/l-lerbert/Makonnen 1993).
These unfavourable labour market developments
in combination with an increase in urban poverty
prompted the Government of India to set new pri-
orities in poverty alleviation during the Seventh
Five Year Plan (1985-1990) and to initiate employ-
ment programmes in urban areas. The challenge
was quite clear: the key to alleviate urban poverty
was the creation of sufficient productive employ-
ment opportunities for the urban poor. However,
economic growth alone does not necessarily lead to
a decline in poverty through trickle down effects.
For this reason, employment generating schemes
for disadvantaged groups are an important instru-
ment for poverty alleviation. In view of the failure
of labour markets to provide adequate wage
employment opportunities, the Government of
India placed emphasis on the direct promotion of
microenterprises which have generally come into
new focus in the development debate in the 1980s
(cf. Levitzky 1989; OECD 1993). Therefore several
employment programmes aimed at supporting
entrepreneurial initiatives of the urban poor have
been introduced since the mid 1980s.
The new emphasis on self-employment promotion
corresponded with the changing views on the
informal sector where self-employment predomi-
nates and which has increasingly been perceived by
development planners as a breeding ground for
poor entrepreneurs operating successfully even
under highly unfavourable economic conditions
(Kabra 1993: 526; cf. De Soto 1988). The development
of the microenterprise sector also closely corre-
sponded to many of the priorities emerging in the
liberalising economy in India such as developing
the private sector, creating employment, alleviating
poverty and encouraging more equitable income
distribution.
One of the first Indian urban employment pro-
grammes was the Nehru Rozgar Yojana (NRY) intro-
duced in 1989. This target group oriented
programme seeks to enable the urban poor to set up
their own small businesses by way of subsidised
bank credits and the provision of training. With
access to productive resources such as credit, the
poor are supposed to make more productive use of
their labour and progressively increase their income
through self-employment and thus cross the
poverty line over time. NRY follows a rather stan-
dardised approach similar to other programmes
designed for self-employment generation in rural as
well as urban areas. Whereas India has wide expe-
rience in implementing rural programmes, analo-
gous experience in urban areas is still limited (Drèze
1990: A-95; Papola 1993: 24). As these pro-
grammes are often considered to be vote catching
programmes, and therefore tend to be heavily polit-
ically oriented, their impact is said to be marginal.
In most cases they are seen as examples of ineffec-
tive bureaucratic approaches to alleviate poverty
because they cannot reach out to the poor effec-
tively and tend to exclude the poorest of the poor.
The provision of credit to the poor often is a major
component of many employment programmes such
as the NRY. The lack of access to productive assets
is one of the main factors preventing the poor from
breaking away from the 'poverty trap' (Getubig
1993: 104). Therefore, it is important that the poor
have continuous access to credits for investment as
well as for consumption purposes. There are differ-
ent views on the success of state controlled sub-
sidised credit programmes in assuring access to
credits for economically disadvantaged groups. In
most cases, it is believed that these programmes
mainly benefit the non-poor. Innovative credit pro-
grammes of NGOs and some commercially oriented
banks have, by contrast, shown remarkable success
in supplying credit to the poor (Getubig 1993,
Lipton 1996).
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Evaluation studies and insights from my own field-
work in Delhi suggest that the performance of cen-
trally initiated self-employment programmes such
as NRY is weak for various reasons. Nevertheless,
the Indian Government adheres to the standardised
design of these employment programmes where
subsidised credit channelled through the banking
system form the major component. The
Government mainly attributes the low performance
to deficiencies in implementing these programmes
rather than questioning the basic approach.
In this article the credit component of NRY as a
given example for a self-employment programme in
the urban context of India will be evaluated using
the experience of other more successful innovative
credit programmes. The objective is to reveal the
underlying logic of the failure of the NRY credit
delivery system. The main argument is that in the
present conceptional design of NRY it is difficult to
open access to individual bank credits for poor first
time borrowers and to establish long-term credit
links with banks. Thus, no structural change in
urban poverty can be expected from NRY and
similar programmes in the near future.
2 Main Features of the Nehru
Rozgar Yojana
The NRY operates under the auspices of the former
Ministry of Urban Development, now the Ministry
of Urban Affairs and Employment after the reshuf-
fle of the cabinet in 1995. It consists of three sub-
schemes for the promotion of employment
(Government of India, Ministry of Urban
Development 1992):
Scheme of Urban Wage Employment (SUWE)
Scheme of Employment through Housing and
Shelter Up gradation (SHASU)
Scheme for Urban Micro Enterprises (SUME)1
Under SUME, unemployed or under-employed
urban poor should be encouraged to start microen-
terprises in the informal sector with the help of sub-
sidised bank loans and training. The promotion of
microenterprises or self-employment ventures also
should have multiplier and employment effects
through the creation of wage-employment in the
The following analysis only refers to the 'Scheme for and SUME are used interchangeably
Urban Microenterprises'. In the following the terms NRY
newly created or expanding units. A further objec-
tive which is not explicitly stated in the stipulations
of the scheme is to open access for the urban poor
to institutional finance thereby reducing their
dependency on informal money lenders (Bank of
India 1992: 16; cf. Lipton 1996: 26).
Eligible beneficiaries, i.e. a permanent resident of
the city or town, a ration card holder living in a
household with an annual income of less than Rs
11,850, can apply for a loan up to an amount of Rs
16,000, which includes a 25 per cent subsidy of Rs
4,000 from the government. For disadvantaged low
caste groups such as Scheduled Castes/Scheduled
Tribes and female beneficiaries the maximum
amount is fixed at Rs 20,000 inclusive of a subsidy
of Rs 5,000. Training courses with the duration of
three months are also part of the scheme. Monthly
stipends of up to Rs 250 per participant are pro-
vided and infrastructural support to training insti-
tutions is given.
The terms and conditions for loans are the follow-
ing: loans up to Rs 7,500 carry an interest rate of 10
per cent, and the interest rate for higher loan
amounts is 11.5 per cent. The loans have to be paid
back within three to five years, with a grace period
which should not exceed six months. Instalments
are fixed on a monthly or quarterly basis depending
on the surplus cash generation of the financed unit.
Margin money, i.e. the financial contribution by the
beneficiaries themselves, and collaterals are not
required. The subsidy is supposed to be disbursed
to the borrower along with the loan.
As under other anti-poverty programmes, the
nationalised commercial banks are supposed to
supply credits according to priority sector lending
quotas. The subsidy and training component is
funded by the Central Government and the State
Governments. The ratio for sharing the financial
burden between the Central and State Governments
is 60:40. Central government funds with an outlay
of Rs 227 Crores (1 Crore = 10,000,000) during the
Eighth Five Year Plan period are channelled
through the State Governments. A department or
office as the nodal agency at the state level and a
These figures were given by the Government of India,
Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment, New Delhi,
January 1996.
SEPUP, introduced in 1985, has been absorbed by NRY
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District Urban Development Agency (DUDA) co-
ordinate and administer the scheme. They are
responsible for handling the funds and identifying
and selecting eligible beneficiaries. Identified
potential borrowers have to fill in application forms
which are sent to DUDA. In this connection, com-
mittees are organised at local level to assess the
financial needs of applicants and to select the bene-
ficiaries. The applications of the pre-selected cases
are forwarded to the banks and again assessed by
the bank staff. In case of their approval DUDA
makes the subsidies available for the banks. The
bank loans together with the subsidies are then dis-
bursed through the existing banking system to the
urban poor.
3 Operational and Institutional
Constraints
Six years after the introduction of NRY, the number
of beneficiaries assisted through bank loans was
742,541, whereas the number of people who have
completed training courses or are presently under-
going training was much lower, amounting to
188,235. A total subsidy amount of Rs 133.30
crores was sanctioned under SUME according to
official figures, as on 31.12.95, calculated on the
basis of reported performance by the States and the
Union Territories.2 NRY has not taken off as it was
expected and planned (Government of India,
Ministry of Urban Development 1994: 10).
The effectiveness of this approach to bring down
the level of poverty considerably is being ques-
tioned by various studies of NRY and of similar pro-
grammes such as the Self-Employment Programme
for the Urban Poor (SEPUP) and the Integrated
Development Programme (IRDP).3 The pro-
grammes are criticised on various grounds. It is
generally believed that self-employment has' great
potential, but it could not fully be exhausted
because of operational and institutional constraints
(cf. e.g. Jam 1990; Reddy 1994; Lall 1994; Muqtada
1989). Major criticism refers to the standardised top
down approach, the identification and selection of
beneficiaries and the role of the banking sector.
in 1992. IRDP, introduced in 1980, is the sister
programme for rural areas. The main feature of these
programmes is the provision of subsidized bank credit
channeled through the nationalised banking system.
Top Down Approach
A major problem area is that these schemes follow a
top down approach with minutely elaborated oper-
ational guidelines from the Central Government,
which add to bureaucratic inertia and cause a range
of managerial problems. These guidelines bind
upon state governments as well as local bodïes.
Under the existing administrative set-up they leave
hardly any flexibïlity and very little scope for exper-
imentation by the project officers or bank officials.
Programme implementation is suffering from a large
number of problems such as difficulties in coordi-
nation, inadequate follow-up and monitoring,
unnecessary delays in implementation caused by
complicated procedures and shortage of qualified
personnel, and lack of commitment, corruption etc.
(cf. Jagannathan 1987: 108ff).
Government and bank officials are primarily inter-
ested in fulfilling their targets in terms of number of
participants and amount of credit and subsidy
Therefore they are less concerned about the sus-
tainability of activities taken up under the scheme
(cf. Bhole 1994: 182). Nevertheless, the targets are
frequently missed and, particularly, the poorest of
the poor often remain excluded for the various rea-
sons elaborated in Section 4.
Identification and selection of beneficiaries
The stipulation concerning the eligibility of benefi-
ciaries on the basis of an annual income limit fixed
at Rs 11,850 is controversial. Government officials
often claim that it is extremely difficult to identify
and select beneficiaries in a metropolis like Delhi
with a household income of less than the official
poverty line under NRY. In many cases, even poor
people often survive on a higher income, and the
poorest of the poor are, in general, hard to reach,
especially by state agencies (Mishra 1994). There is
a uniform income limit for All-India and officials
suspect that it is an incorrect income limit.
However, it seems that it is only a welcome excuse
for their low engagement in the scheme. In addition
to that, income assessments by field surveyors or
bank staff are difficult to make and somewhat arbi-
trary, in particular for self-employed persons
because they often do not keep any records on their
income.
Furthermore, the identification and selection
process of eligible beneficiaries is rather long and
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cumbersome. From the perspective of the benefi-
ciaries, this bureaucratic approach to poverty allevi-
ation has various kinds of problems. It may be
argued that in view of the elements of bureaucracy
and arbitrariness, the identification and selection is
not necessarily directed towards the financial needs
of the poor. First, it is often very difficult to get the
loan when it is most needed. Second, the loan
amount is often considered to be too small to
finance economically viable projects. The limited
scope for setting up viable self-employment activi-
ties often leads to a low repayment capacity for the
poor, and this again makes banks very reluctant to
lend out to the poor.
Involvement of the banks
A major critical problem area is the involvement of
the nationalised banks in the programme. In the
past, banks had little interest in providing bank
loans to the poor and financing informal sector
enterprises. The reforms in the banking sector since
1991 will probably further contribute to the low
engagement of the banks in the scheme. The
reforms will lead to a neglect of priority sector lend-
ing and to a diminishing role of social banking. Due
to the new emphasis on efficiency and profitability
banks are increasingly reluctant to lend to small
borrowers (Majumdar 1995: 2169). The share of
the priority sectors in total net bank credit declined
consistently from 40.9 per cent in June 1991 to 35
per cent in June 1993, although the target of 40 per
cent remained unchanged.
The reasons behind this are well known
(Anagol/Sundaram 1995). The risks involved in
lending to the poor are too high and the recovery of
loans is thought to be low because of their low
repayment capacity They cannot open a bank
account for their savings or provide any other bank
securities or collaterals. Since the NRY loan amount
is rather small, high transaction costs occur. In addi-
tion to this, the follow-up of loan repayment is diffi-
cult because borrowers are not always easy to trace,
especially in urban areas where they tend to be scat-
tered over the whole city or townand they may not
have a permanent address. There is also the risk that
immigrants take the loan and then go back to their
villages. In these cases, the banks must write off their
credits. Consequently, applications by NRY borrow-
ers are rejected by the banks on a large scale and a
large number of applications are kept pending.
As a result, the provision of subsidised bank credits
under NRY is not geared to the financial needs of
the poor. As they get in most cases only one credit
under NRY, access to institutional finance has not
increased, thus hampering their ability to operate
microenterprises or income activities successfully
As will be argued below, the behaviour of banks is
rational from their point of view, which is one major
factor for the low performance of employment pro-
grammes, and this has an important bearing on the
effectiveness of NRY as an instrument for urban
poverty alleviation.
4 Weaknesses of the Credit
Delivery System under NRY
The basic objective of any credit programme aimed
at alleviating poverty must be to eliminate access
barriers to credits for the poor and to make credits
available to them. This implies that the programmes
must attain sustainability, thereby increasing long-
term credit access (Rudkin 1994). Experiences with
innovative credit models (e.g. Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh, SEWA in India) more informal by
nature, have shown that this is not an impossible
task. The poor are a bankable group (Stearns 1985;
Tendler 1989; Rhyne 1992; Getubig 1993;
Krahnen/Schmidt 1994). The basic questions to be
asked are: what are the underlying reasons why the
urban poor are unlikely to gain access to the bank-
ing system and how can these constraints be
overcome?
Theoretically, an important element in a credit
transaction is uncertainty In the case of informal
finance, personalised credit contracts and a per-
sonal relationship between borrower and lender
reduces the uncertainty of the credit transaction.
The principle of reciprocity plays a major role for
lenders as well as for borrowers who are interested
in the stability of their relationship (Ghate et al.
1992: 5). Thus, there are built-in incentives for pro-
viding and paying back credits. The formal credit
transactions are by comparison more anonymous
and therefore tend to be more uncertain by nature.
Uncertainty causes so-called information and trans-
action costs for all parties involved in establishing
mechanisms to ensure that the required credit
amount is available when needed or païd back
according to the repayment schedule agreed.
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The level of information and transaction costs that
the suppliers and consumers of financial services
have to pay largely depends on the behaviour of the
actors (BMZ 1994: 11; Richter 1994: 9). The pre-
vailing incentive and sanction structures govern the
behaviour of institutions, of the people inside the
institutions and of the people with whom the insti-
tutions have to deal (KrahnenlSchmidt 1992: 80ff).
With reference to the economics of information, it
can be said that formal, more anonymous credit
transactions in particular are characterised by asym-
metrically distributed information between the bor-
rower and the lender. This applies especially to
urban areas where transactions between borrowers
and bank staff are highly impersonal.
From the perspective of the banks, uncertainty as to
how the borrower will behave or whether he or she
will default or refuse the repayment of the credit
cannot be eliminated completely Thus, there must
either be incentives for borrowers to pay back or
sanctions need to be imposed on the defaulter. In
the latter case, it is important whether contracts can
be legally enforced. In commercial banking, for
example, credit is secured by providing collaterals
and often depends on how banks can materialise
their claims towards the borrower.
Since the urban poor cannot normally provide tan-
gible collaterals, other techniques to motivate
repayment should be applied to substitute repay-
ment motivators for costly information gathering by
bank staff and legal procedures (Rhyne 1993: 29).
Experience from informal finance delivery systems
show that in the absence of tangible collaterals and
legal enforcement mechanisms, techniques to
ensure repayment can include:
group guarantees or pressure from the borrowers'
networks
the promise of repeat loans, in increasing
amounts
savings requirements
The substitution of costly information gathering by
repayment incentives reduces lender risks and low-
ers information and transaction costs. The reduc-
tion of default rates and information and
transaction costs contributes to the reduction of the
total credit costs, thus indirectly contributing to the
profitability of banking operations and probably
higher lending rates for poor borrowers.
Against this more theoretical background the rea-
sons for the reluctance of the nationalised commer-
cial banks under NRY can be illustrated. The basic
problem is that banks have no genuine incentives to
provide credits to the urban poor in their own inter-
est, nor do the poor borrowers have any incentives
to pay NRY credits back, which in turn reinforces
the indifference of banks towards NRY. However,
according to priority sector lending quotas imposed
by the Indian Government, banks have to lend out
to the urban poor under schemes like NRY. Under
these circumstances the risks for banks to lend out
to this group are comparatively high given the
anonymous nature of credit transactions in urban
agglomerations.
The banks are forced, therefore, to minimise their
lending risks by gathering information on borrow-
ers and their creditworthiness as well as establish-
ing complicated and lengthy procedures for the
identification and selection of reliable borrowers.
This process is quite costly for banks, especially as
hardly any sanctions as alternatives for reducing
lending risks can be imposed on defaulting or non-
paying borrowers. Tangible collaterals are not
required and since most of the poor borrowers
operate outside the reach of legal enforcement sys-
tems it is rather difficult to execute credit contracts
by legal procedures. These relatively high informa-
tion and transaction costs connected with the selec-
tion of poor borrowers cannot be covered by a
corresponding increase in the interest rates since
they are fixed at 10 per cent and 11.5 per cent
respectively Through the public provision of subsi-
dies the government seeks to ease the financial bur-
den of banks, but the attitude of banks towards this
lending group has not changed substantially In
some cases, there are even indications that the
banks probably provide the subsidies given by the
states as bank loans to the poor.
Another way to reduce information and transaction
costs for banks is the involvement of DUDA, the
nodal agency at district level responsible for the
implementation of NRY or through NGOs.
However, the costs are not reduced by shifting the
responsibility of selecting eligible borrowers from
banks to this agency or to the NGOs, they are
During fieldwork in Delhi it was observed that the
amount of credits applied for is considerably less than the
amount of credit disbursed. As the amount of subsidies is
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simply transferred outside the banking system. This
transfer may encourage bank lending and con-
tribute to higher profitability of their operations.
However, it entails an even more complicated selec-
tion process with increasing bureaucracy and inner
and intra agency problems due to necessary co-
ordination efforts. This also corresponds with an
increase in administrative costs for implementing
NRY and delivering credits to the poor.
Also from the perspective of the borrowers, rela-
tively high transaction costs occur. They are often
prepared to bear these costs because no other
source of credit is available to them (cf. Lipton
1996: 27). They have to meet the information
requirements of DUDA and the banks, which
include frequent visits, and the clearance from
other banks and financial institutions to confirm
that no credits are taken under other schemes.
These visits entail transport costs and, in addition,
opportunity costs in terms of lost income due to
absence from their business. Since no established
links to the formal banking system exist the bor-
rowers often depend on intermediaries or more
dubious middlemen to help them to get a NRY
credit. In the latter case, the borrowers often have to
pay bribes, not only to DUDA or bank staff but to
the middlemen as well. They distribute the applica-
tion forms and charge the poor with fees for forms
which are free of cost. However, the poor cannot be
sure whether these applications are actually for-
warded to the banks.
The repayment mentality of the borrowers largely
depends on the ability to pay and the willingness to
pay The ability to pay depends on the income gen-
erating capacities of the activities financed with the
NRY credit. The latter is influenced by a host of fac-
tors which determine whether the borrower will-
fully defaults on the repayment. This again depends
on the existing incentive and sanction structure. As
there are no effective sanction mechanisms which
can be imposed by the banks for defaulting the will-
ingness to pay rests on the incentives built in to the
credit delivery system. But, since there are no
repayment incentives other than the casual follow-
up by the bank or DUDA staff, the repayment rate
is likely to remain low.
calculated on the basis of the amount stated in the
application forms, there may be some cases where only
the subsidies are disbursed as credits.
5 Conclusions
There is a consensus that credit is one of the most
important instruments to alleviate poverty
However, it is rather difficult to reach the urban
poor because banks perceive them as a non-bank-
able group. In this context, the disenchantment
with traditional subsidised credit programmes
aimed at supporting the poor to widen their pro-
ductive asset base and to develop sustainable self-
employment activities is not of recent origin.
Several studies on successful programmes suggest
that informal credit is more effective than formal
arrangements in reaching precisely those categories
of borrowers sought to be benefited by credit
quotas.
Nevertheless, the Indian government still follows a
standardised design of centrally sponsored employ-
ment programmes where subsidised credit is the
major component. Thus, in the present framework,
the nationalised commercial banks play a key role
in alleviating urban poverty Their low engagement
in these programmes such as NRY, therefore, has
serious repercussions on the performance and effec-
tiveness of direct programmes to reduce urban
poverty sustainably and on a large scale.
Fixing targets and credit quotas does not ensure
that the urban poor have easy access to formal
finance. A major reason for the limited access to
individual bank credits is the existing incentive and
sanction structure in the credit delivery system. It
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